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V

JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-

3(2)0).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On April 17, 1991, Appellant, Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Macris"), filed

suit against Images and Attitude, Inc. ("Images"), alleging that Images had breached its
distributorship agreement with Macris (^'Macris F). See Macris & Assocs., Inc. v.
Neways, Inc., 2002 UT App 406, ^ 2, 60 P.3d 1176.1 (R. 192-203.)
2.

On September 1, 1992, almost three years before the trial of Macris I,

Images sold some of its assets to Neways. Id. (R. 350-352.)
3.

On February 14, 1995, before any judgment had been entered against

Images, and almost three years after Images sold certain assets to Neways, Macris filed
this action against Neways and the Mowers, alleging "that the transfer of assets from
Images to Neways left Images without sufficient assets to cover any judgment rendered
against it in Macris F ("Macris IF). Id at Tf 3. (R. 1-12.) Macris alleged that Neways
and the Mowers were liable to Macris on theories of fraudulent transfer, alter ego, and
1

The claims in this action and in Macris I are the subject of four previous
appellate court opinions. Neways will cite to the opinions, as well as the appellate
record, as support for certain background facts and procedural history. Macris & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 941 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Macris & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 1999 UT App 406, 986 P.2d 748; Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways,
Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214; and Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2002 UT
App 406, 60 P.3d 1176.
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successor liability Id, Mac us also M»i]ti"Jn i miiun damages, based on the distributorship
agree nit ill ;i! J,VUK. in Macris J, that wei e not awarded in Macris I. (Id.)
4.

Two days later, on February 16, 1995, the bench trial in Macris 1 begai

*" \ t

the conclusion of the *, . •, the district couri dnenmnul ili;il In \\yr*< Irnl materially
breached its c<

. *

'r

"'00? III App 406, U 4. Images stipulated that it owed

Maciis $360,681.20 in contract damages. (R. 959 N Tie judgment against Images was
entered on or about September H.
5.

1

^;

: (the 'Images juclj.jiinif i' 11-

~ '•'

(|

(lli I i

- apparently caused writs of garnishment to be

issued and served on Neways and its counsel. Neways responded that it was not holding
any monies due and owing to Images.
6.

(

.

00-908.)
•

"

J iui summar ' judgment in Macris 11,

asserting that Macris's claims were barred by res judicata.
7.

Id.

Macris cross-moved for summary judgment on :;* .:-:;*

Micu'ssor

liability h
8.

On January 22, 1996, the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment

came on for hearing before the Honorable Howard Maetani in ir-puiiM' H^ \\ i MK WMMJLJ
by the Court h, ,_ .

>

4

.suibS counsel stated as follows:

On June 19, 1997, this Court affirmed the Images Judgment. See Macris &
Assocs.,lnc. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 941 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1997),
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MR. KARRENBERG:

That's why I would do the same thing. I wouldn't add
the third corporation, your Honor, because one, the fraudulem
transfer action to the third corporation requires I first get a
judgment from this Court that can't be collected somewhere.
I mean, if I can collect this other judgment against Images,
the fraudulent transfer goes away by its [own] sake. I can
only collect my judgments [once], correct? You know what I
mean?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. KARRENBERG: If I go out and find Images has
some — if we come in here and by the time we go to trial I've
collected. I find Images had some assets, and I've collected
the full judgment for the first breach of Judge Burningham,
the fraudulent transfer is gone. By nature it doesn't
matter. I've collected my judgment. They can fraudulent
transfer all they want. I haven't been damaged by the
fraudulent transfer.
(R. 507 at 40-41; emphasis added.)
9.

On November 13, 1997, the district court ruled that Neways, as Images's

successor, was responsible to pay the Images Judgment awarded to Macris and that res
judicata barred all of Macris's other claims for damages against Neways. (R. 467.)
10.

Based on the district court's ruling, Macris caused two writs of garnishment

to be issued and served on Zions Bank and First Interstate Bank, respectively, on or about
November 19, 1997. First Interstate Bank responded that it held approximately $11,100
owing to Neways. Zions Bank responded that it had $568,714 in Neways's funds. (R.
890-898.)
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11.

Later, Neways postt •.

- ; "M

and the garnished funds were released. (R. 491.)
12.

Both Neways and Macris appealed the district court's order granting

summary judgment. Specifically, Neways sought to reverse the court's ruling that
Neways was responsible for the Images Judgment based on successor liability. On the
other hand, Macris challenged the court's ruling that res judicata precluded the award of
any additional contract damages. (R. 460, 490.)
13.

On July 22, 1999, this Court issued an opinion reversing the district court's

order of summary judgment on both grounds, concluding that Macris's claims were not
barred by res judicata and that disputed issues of fact existed regarding the issue of
successor liability. See Macris & Assocs., Inc., v. Neways, Inc., 1999 UT App 230, \ i7,
986

748. (R. 523.)
14.

Neways and the Mowers, but not Macris, sought a ^ i;; • . certiorari, w: .h

the Utah Supreme Court granted. (R. 539.) On December 5, 2( •

e cuun

affirmed this Court's determination ti.ai Macris's claims of alter ego, fraudulent
conveyance, and successor liability were not barred by res judicata. The supreme court
further concluded, however, that issue preclusion barred Macris from seeking additional
contract damages against Neways and the Mowers/thus limiting Macris's claims against
defendants solely to the Images Judgment, if Macris could prove its claims. See Macris
& Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, lnc.,2(
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15.

For the very first time, on February 1, 2001, Maoris's new counsel, Paul C.

Droz, wrote a letter to Wade Winegar, as "counsel of record for Images & Attitude, Inc.,"
demanding that "Images & Attitude, Inc

satisfy the enclosed Judgment entered in this

case on September 14, 1995." (R. 889.) (A true and correct copy of the letter is attached
as Exhibit "A.")
16.

Just over two weeks later, on February 16, 2001, the Images Judgment was

paid in full, including interest, in the amount of $746,356.97. (R. 887.)
17.

On April 12, 2001, Macris filed a Satisfaction of Judgment. (R. 885.)

18.

Following satisfaction of the Images Judgment, Neways and the Mowers

again moved for summary judgment in Macris II, arguing that Macris II was moot
because the Images Judgment had been paid and that, under the Utah Supreme Court's
opinion, Macris was barred from seeking further contract damages. (R. 626.)
19.

In response, Macris asserted, for the first time, that the action was not moot

because the attorneys' fees incurred in Macris //were recoverable as consequential
damages against Images under the third-party litigation exception. (R. 645-650.)
20.

On August 2, 2001, the district court granted the motion for summary

judgment filed by Neways and the Mowers, concluding that Macris's claims for
fraudulent transfer, alter ego, and successor liability became moot once the Images
Judgment was paid. (R. 736-745.)
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21.

Macris appealed tJJi diMmi n mirl\ uuln j:i.'niiir J | '

MJIJ

iii h i ! \ j u t l ;

II

Jt III mi I i

Ntv.^ys iiin1 11 "'Mowers
22.

This Court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment,

holding that Macris could recover attorneys' fees as consequential damages, under the

consequence of Images's breach and that it was necessary to bring the action." Macris &
Assocs.f Inc. v. Newqys, Inc., 2002 UT App 406, \ 22, 60 P.3d 1176. «K 6723.

i.)

1

attorneys' fees, "such fees are limited to those incurred before the contract claim
against Images was satisfied," i.e., February 16, 2001. Id at.^f 23 (emphasis added).
• 24.

T 1 1 * t ""t'H'l liirihi i «> h i l u ) l h ; i | Mini

v

11 Li I'»n H 1 m m l n n j ' r s m i l s l l m s i *

dan lages incuncu * in litigation with a thii d part)7 to recover its contract damages [from
Macris I\" Id. (emphasis added).
25.

After this Court, remanded tl le case tc tl le disti ict cc i n L, } Jew ays ai id tl i z

Jvlcm ( rs served Requests for Production of Documents on Macris.
26.

On or about June 4, 2003, in response to the document requests, Macris

admitted that the February 1, 200L dei :i lai id lettei I i: • : i :t i ] Ill i Di oz was tl ic f ii st i ;i id :)iily
tii i ic I Iaci is 1 lad evei demanded that In lages pay the Images Judgment. (R. 881-882.) (A
true and correct copy of Macris's response to the Requests for Production of Documents
is attached as Exhibit "B.")
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27.

On March 1, 2004, the district court entered an order (1) denying Macris's

motion to compel the production of certain discovery from Neways and the Mowers and
(2) bifurcating Macris's claims in this action. The district court ordered as follows:
The Court hereby bifurcates the issue of whether Macris II
was a natural consequence of Images' breach and, therefore,
necessary to obtain satisfaction of judgment, and this issue
shall be tried before other issues, if any, in this case.
(R. 867-869.)
28.

On November 1, 2004, the district court entered an order granting the

motion for summary judgment filed by Neways and the Mowers, determining that Macris
had failed to produce evidence "to prove that this action was a natural consequence of the
alleged fraudulent transfer by Images & Attitude, Inc. and that it was necessary to file
this action." (R. 1070.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As the district court aptly stated, "this action is far too old, and should be
resolved." (R. 859.) Once again, however, Macris appeals the district court's ruling,
arguing that the court erred in limiting the scope of discovery and in bifurcating the issue
of whether this lawsuit was a "necessary" consequence of Images' alleged actions.
Properly exercising its broad discretion in discovery matters, the district court concluded
that Macris's discovery requests exceeded the narrow issue before the court, i.e., whether
this action was necessary. The district court committed no error of law and did not base
its decision on a lack of evidence. Accordingly, the order was proper.
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• .

E v e n i f llii:*'I null m i l m dt k m m i t IfuiMhi d i s m u i N H H I H \s,r, mi.Tioi

Miiur

y (Tf'i i tl Kf 11 u ii i mi because of the court's ruling. The district court ultimately granted
summary judgment to Neways and the Mowers because Macris failed to produce any
evidence showing that this action was necessary, 11 is undisjnih <l dial In;loir I < hruai v
?IH) I Mat! iv tinv? drnifiTidcd thai the Images Judgment be satisfied. Also, the record
reflects that Macris had evidence that it previously obtained in this action and in Macris I
that could possibly have been used in an attempt to create a factual issue on summary
judgmeni

Matin. Iiiiwivei f.nlnl to pit n nf an > nf itir < \ i d c n c e . A c c o r d i n g l y , any

error in the district court's discovery order was harmless.
Macris erroneously argues that Neways and the Mowers were required to come
forward \

equential

damages. To the contrary, Neways and the Mowers met their initial burden by showing
that there was a lack of evidence to support an essential element < I Macris s claim on
w h i c h it h a d llu I ' l i i i k n n i p i o o l

tli.il (llmr ;it lion v ii«- tin r s s a n

M M I ,JS «,t;f ( nid \\ <><

Macris failed to avail itself of the evidence in the record in an attempt to create a factual
issue on summary judgment. Thus, the district court properly entered summary judgment
in favor ol Nt \SJS w i n d ilu M o i u i . s , A" < n i d i n j ' h

'hi> i imri l|nn|d

« , mi,ui>, i )i ders and bring this ten-year-old c a s e to a c l o s e .

IT

l \2
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n i r m tin i l ^ H u t

i

ARGUMENT
I.

MACRIS HAS FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE DISTRICT COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO
BIFURCATE AND IN DENYING THE MOTION TO COMPEL.
On March 1, 2004, the district court entered an order stating as follows:
The Court hereby bifurcates the issue of
whether Macris II was a natural consequence of the
Images breach and, therefore, necessary to obtain
satisfaction ofjudgment, and this issue shall be tried
before other issues, if any, in this case.

(R. 867-869.) Macris argues that the district court erred when it (1) bifurcated the issue
of whether Macris II "was a natural consequence o f Images's alleged conduct and (2)
denied Macris's motion to compel discovery.3 A district court has "broad latitude in
handling discovery matters." R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d
1068, 1079 (Utah 1997). "An appellate court will not find abuse of discretion absent an
erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial court to
rule on." Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996). Also, in deciding
discovery matters, the district court may "decide controverted factual issues," "draw
inferences where conflicting inferences are possible," and "weigh competing interests."
Id. (citation omitted). "The propriety of an interrogatory or other discovery is primarily
for the trial court to determine." State Road Comm 'n v. Petty, 412 P.2d 914, 918 (Utah
3

As this Court previously noted, Macris does not have a direct claim against
Neways or the Mowers under the third-party litigation exception. Macris & Assocs.,
2002UTApp,406,Tfl9.
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1966). 'The district court is in an advantaged position in proximity to all aspects of the
lawsuit," and it is therefore "practical and desirable that he be allowed considerable
latitude of discretion in his rulings thereon." Id. Because Macris has failed to meet its
burden to show that the district court made any erroneous conclusion of law, or that there
was no evidentiary basis for the ruling, the order denying the motion to compel should be
affirmed.
A.

The District Court Did Not Make Any Errors of Law or Base Its
Decision On a Lack of Evidence,

"The district court is entrusted with broad discretion in dealing with discovery
matters, [including] protective orders." In re Discipline of Pendleton, 2000 UT 77, ^ 38,
11 P.3d 284. Under Rule 26(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court
has discretion to limit the use of discovery if "the discovery is unduly burdensome or
expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
limitations on the parties' resources and the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation." Also, the court may enter a protective order requiring 'that certain matters
not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters."
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(c)(4). Finally, bifurcation is an issue within the sound discretion of
the district court. See Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30, If 5, 996 P.2d 565.
In its brief, Macris argues that the district court concluded that Macris must "make
a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief before being permitted to conduct
discovery." (Brief of Appellant ["Applnt. Br."] at 8; emphasis in original.) Macris,

UT DOCS A #1173440 v2
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however, points to no record citation showing that the district court made such a
determination. In fact, by failing to request the transcript of the district court's hearing
on the motion to compel, Macris has failed to ensure an adequate record on appeal. In
the absence of a transcript, this Court will "assume the regularity of the proceedings
below." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,1J11, 12 P.3d 92 (citation omitted).
In any event, the district court properly denied the motion to compel because
Macris's discovery requests did not address the issue of whether this action had to be
filed in February 1995 as a result of Images's alleged wrongful conduct.4 For instance, in
its interrogatories, Macris inquired about "the total value of the assets owned by Neways,
Inc. as of August 30, 1992." (R. 827.) Also, Macris asked about the assets of Images as
of August 30, 1992, that were not acquired by Neways in August 1992. (Id.) The district
court exercised its discretion to limit inquiry into these matters because they did not
directly address the narrow issue on remand: whether it was necessary for Macris to file
this action in February 1995 because of Images's alleged wrongful conduct. The district
court concluded that, based on the limited scope of issues on remand and on Macris's
undisputed failure to make a demand for payment on Images until February 2001,
Macris's discovery requests went too far afield and did not bear on whether the action

4

At the time this action was filed, the trial in Macris I had not yet begun. Thus,
this action was not necessary at the time it was filed because Macris did not yet have a
judgment against Images. (Statement of Facts, ^ 3.)
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was necessary. (R. 853.) Thus, Macris has failed to show that the district court
committed error. See Askew, 918 P.2d at 472.
To prove that this action was necessary, Macris was required to establish that
Images's alleged wrongful conduct was the proximate cause of this lawsuit. See South
Sandpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Utah 1988) (stating that fees are not
recoverable "on causes of action not proximately necessitated by that defendant's
negligence"). The necessity of filing this action cannot be proven merely by showing
that Images had little or no assets in August 1992, over three years before the Images
Judgment was entered. Indeed, even if Macris could prove that Images fraudulently
transferred its assets, that fact alone would not establish that this action was "necessary,"
particularly because Macris never demanded payment of the Images Judgment until
February 2001. See Sanner v. Poll, 298 B.R. 557, 564 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003) (stating
that even though party had breached real estate purchase contract, that breach did not
cause any litigation with a third party). The question of whether the "party sought to be
charged with the fees was guilty of a wrongful or negligent act" is a separate issue from
whether the third-party litigation was "the natural and necessary consequence[] of the
defendant's act, since remote, uncertain, and contingent consequences do not afford a
basis for recovery." Uyemura v. Wick, 551 P.2d 171, 176 (Haw. 1976). Thus, Macris
must still prove the element of "causation" to recover attorneys' fees as consequential
damages. Pack, 765 P.2d at 1283.

UT DOCS.A #1173440 v2
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In its unique position, the district court was aware of the long procedural history of
this action and what had been done to move the case forward. (R. 859.) TTie district
court was aware that if Macris had intended to recover attorneys' fees when it filed this
action, Macris should have made efforts early in the case to establish that this action was
necessary, such as by requiring Images to appear in a supplemental proceeding to testify
regarding its assets.5 Based on these factors, the district court exercised its broad
discretion to bifurcate the case and limit the scope of discovery to the issue of whether
this action was proximately caused, and made "necessary," by Images's alleged wrongful
conduct. See id The district court's discovery order was not based on an erroneous view
of the law or on a lack of evidence. Thus, the discovery order should be affirmed. See
Askew, 91* P.2d at 472.
B.

Macris Suffered No Prejudice By the Court's Ruling.

Even if this Court were to determine that the district court committed some error
in its discovery order, the district court's denial of the motion to compel was harmless.
An error is "harmless" if there is "no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the
outcome of the proceedings." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796-97 (Utah
1991). As set forth more fully below, the district court's ultimate decision to dismiss this
case was supported by Macris's failure to have demanded payment of the Images

5

Indeed, this Court pointed out that Macris did not ask for attorneys' fees in its
Complaint against Neways. 2002 UT App 406, H 8, n.7.
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Judgment until February 2001, well after this action was filed. Moreover, Macris failed
to avail itself of post-judgment remedies against Images that would have been beneficial
in determining Images's willingness and ability to pay the Images Judgment in
September 1995. As stated in Leslie D. Mower's Affidavit dated November 21, 1995,
"Neways did not purchase all the assets of Images." (R. 352.) After obtaining the
Images Judgment, however, Macris never sought an order in supplemental proceedings
requiring Images to appear and testify about the assets that it had at that time. See Utah
R. Civ. P. 69(o). Instead, Macris served writs of garnishment on Neways in an attempt to
garnish Images's funds allegedly held by Neways. Macris never attempted to garnish any
of Images's bank accounts. Thus, no amount of discovery could have cured Macris's
prior failure to investigate Images's ability to satisfy the Images Judgment from
September 1995, when the Images Judgment was entered, until February 2001, when the
Images Judgment was paid within fifteen days after demand.
In addition, in as early as 1995, Macris had already conducted discovery in this
action regarding the alleged sale of Images's assets.6 On August 28, 1995, counsel for
Macris took the deposition of Richard L. Halliday, in which the deponent was asked
about the transfer of assets to Neways, among other topics. (R. 241.) In addition, Tom

6

Macris had the opportunity to conduct discovery in this action from February
1995 to February 1996, when the district court stayed the case pending the appeal in
Macris L Also, there were several months in 1997 and in 2001, when the district court
had jurisdiction over this case, when Macris could have conducted discovery.
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Mower stated in an Affidavit that he had been deposed in Macris I on the topics of
"Neways, its creation, and the sale of Images assets to Neways." (R. 231.) Thus, Macris
already had evidence potentially relating to the alleged fraudulent transfer that it could
have used in an attempt to defeat Neways's motion for summary judgment.7 Ultimately,
Macris failed to marshal the available evidence in an attempt to create a factual issue to
prevent summary judgment. Thus, any error of the district court in its interlocutory order
denying the motion to compel was harmless.8
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF NEWAYS AND THE MOWERS.
Macris argues that, in considering Neways's motion for summary judgment, the

district court erroneously required Macris to come forward with evidence to support its
In noting that Macris may already have had evidence that it could have
produced in response to the motion for summary judgment, Neways and the Mowers do
not concede that such evidence would have been sufficient to create a factual issue.
Rather, Neways and the Mowers refer to these record citations to show that Macris
apparently had some evidence that may have related to its fraudulent-transfer claim. It
was Macris's burden to present that evidence to the district court in response to the
motion for summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). Macris failed to do so,
however, and summary judgment was properly entered. Id.
8

Macris erroneously argues that a "court's error in failing to require discovery is
presumed to have been prejudicial and mandates reversal." In Askew v. Hardman, 884
P.2d 1258 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), rev'don other grounds, 918 P.2d 469 (Utah 1996), this
Court stated that the burden is on the party resisting discovery to prove that an error was
harmless. This Court never stated, however, that reversal is mandated in such
circumstances. In Askew, the defendant had "not demonstrated that the denial of
Plaintiffs discovery request was not prejudicial." Id. at 1263. By contrast, Neways has
met its burden to present sufficient evidence to show that any error committed by the
district court in denying the motion to compel was harmless.
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claim that this action was necessary. Macris argues that "defendants offered no evidence
that the Images judgment would have been paid without the need for the Neways
litigation." (Applnt. Br. at 13.) Macris's arguments turn the evidentiary burden of proof
on its head. Neways did not have the burden to show that the Images Judgment 'Svould
have been paid" even if this action had not been filed. Rather, as the party seeking
attorneys' fees as consequential damages for Images's alleged wrongful conduct, Macris
had the burden to prove that this action was necessary. Macris & Assocs., 2002 UT App
406, ^ 22 (stating that, to recover under the third-party litigation exception, Macris must
prove the elements of the exception); see also Lovett v. Estate ofLovett, 593 A.2d 382,
389 (N.J. Super. 1991) (noting that it is "plaintiffs burden" to prove causation under the
third-party litigation exception).
A.

Neways and the Mowers Were Not Required to Produce Affirmative
Evidence to Negate Macris's Claims,

In its brief, Macris relies heavily on Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970),
for the proposition that, to defeat summary judgment, Macris was not required to produce
any evidence to support its claims. The proper scope of the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Adickes was discussed in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 411 U.S. 317 (1986).
There, the Supreme Court determined that there is "no express or implied requirement in
Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials
negating the opponent's claim." Id. at 322. The Court clarified that Adickes should not
be "construed to mean that the burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to
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produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with
respect to an issue on which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof." Id. at 325.
Instead, the Court stated that the "burden on the moving party may be discharged by
'showing5 - that is, pointing out to the district court - that there is an absence of evidence
to support the non-moving party's case." Id. The Court emphasized that one of the
principal purposes of Rule 56 "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or
defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this
purpose." Id. at 323; see also Reagan Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776,
779 (Utah 1984) (stating that a major purpose of summary judgment is "to avoid
unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to determine whether
there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder").
In Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), this Court cited
Celotex Corp. with approval and quoted language from the opinion stating that a moving
party is entitled to summary judgment when the non-moving party "has failed to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the
burden of proof." Id. at 1391 (emphasis added; citation omitted). In Schafir, this Court
noted that the plaintiff had the burden of proof to establish that the defendant had
knowledge of certain plumbing problems. Because the plaintiff failed to produce
evidence to support an element of the claim on which the plaintiff had the burden of
proof, summary judgment was properly granted. Id.

i IT n n r c A *M 177Z40 M1)

17

In this case, the district court properly followed the standards set forth in Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, as adopted by this Court. At the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment filed by Neways and the Mowers, counsel for Macris argued that
[w]here we have to carry our burden is at trial, and the
way that will be done at trial is we will put on the two people
who owned Images and Attitudes in 1992, the Mowers, and ask
them whether they had any assets. They will either take the fifth,
from which the adverse inference can be drawn, or they'll admit
that there were no assets in Images and Attitudes.
(Transcript of Hearing, September 21, 2004, at 16.) In its ruling, the district court stated
as follows:
I agree with the proposition that Macris can't simply sit back
and say, "Wait until we get to trial. We'll show you everything."
The case has reached - this case, in its uniqueness, has reached the
posture of a time to demonstrate the inability to pay, rather than
relying upon what may be done in the future.
Mr. Eckersley, you are absolutely correct that there is a
burden of proof on the party moving for this kind of relief, but the
rules also, as they have been modified now, say that once this ruling
is requested, and once a reasonable legitimate application of law and
the facts are made to the Court, then the responding party has the
responsibility to come forth with sufficient information to
demonstrate that those scales do not weigh in favor of the moving
party anymore, and they stay on your side.
(Id. at 19.) Thus, the district court properly rejected Macris's attempt to place on Neways
and the Mowers the burden of proof on an essential element of Macris's claim for
consequential damages, i.e., showing that this action was necessary. See Schafir, 879
P.2dat 1391.
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B.

Macris Failed to Rely on Available Evidence in an Attempt to Create
an Issue of Fact

In response to the motion for summary judgment, Macris expressly stated that it
did "not dispute the factual statements offered by defendants." (R. 1052.) Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the statement of
undisputed and material facts in the supporting memorandum filed by Neways and the
Mowers was deemed admitted. (R. 1070.) In addition, Macris did not file a motion
under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure asking for more time to conduct
discovery in the case. Instead, in its written response to the motion for summary
judgment, Macris argued that the "necessity of the present action is established by the
allegations of the complaint (which are unrebuted by any evidence) that Images had no
assets from which it could satisfy the Macris' claim (either before or after it was reduced
to judgment) following its September 1, 1992, fraudulent transfer to Neways." (R. 1047.)
Thus, at its own peril, Macris rested almost exclusively on its pleadings to oppose the
motion for summary judgment. See Celotex, 411 U.S. at 325.
The only evidence that Macris offered in opposition to Neways's motion was an
unauthenticated copy of the Asset Purchase Agreement.9 Macris presented no testimony
showing the financial condition of Images at any point in time between September 1995
9

To avoid authenticity issues, Macris could have relied on the Affidavit of
Leslie D. Mower, dated November 21, 1995, which attached a copy of the Asset Purchase
Agreement. That affidavit however, states unequivocally that Images did not transfer all
its assets to Neways.
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through February 2001. Nor did Macris dispute that it took no formal steps, such as
obtaining an order in supplemental proceedings, to discover what assets Images had when
the Images Judgment was entered in September 1995. Also, Macris did not dispute that it
never demanded payment of the Images Judgment until February 2001. Summary
judgment was appropriate because, as a matter of law, Macris failed to produce evidence
supporting an essential element of its claim, i.e., that the filing of this action was a
"natural consequence" of Images's alleged wrongful conduct and that this action was
"necessary."10
As stated previously, there is evidence in the record that Macris potentially could
have offered in response to the motion for summary judgment in an attempt to create a
factual issue. For instance, in August 1995, Macris took the deposition of Richard L.
Halliday. The portion of the transcript of Mr. Halliday's deposition appearing in the
record reflects that Macris's attorney asked questions about the creation of Neways. (R.
241.) In addition, Tom Mower was deposed in Macris 1 regarding fraudulent-transfer
issues, and Macris could have attached portions of his deposition transcript to its
memorandum opposing the motion for summary judgment. (R. 231.) Macris simply
failed to marshal any of the available evidence in an attempt to create an issue of fact that
would preclude summary judgment.
10

Because the Utah Supreme Court ruled that Macris was not entitled to
additional contract damages in this action, that portion of the complaint was not
"necessary" on those grounds alone. See 2000 UT 93, U 47.
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Instead, Macris chose to argue that Neways had the burden to produce evidence
that Images 'Svould have" satisfied the judgment in 1995, a burden that Neways and the
Mowers were not required to shoulder. Thus, Macris failed to offer evidence that the
filing of this action was "a direct and necessary consequence o f Images's alleged
fraudulent transfer. Hitachi Credit America Corp. v. Signet Bank, 166 F.3cl 614, 632 (4th
Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs expenditures in third-party litigation were not caused
by Signet's breach of contract, and were not a direct and necessary consequence of such
breach of contract); see also Lovett v. Estate ofLovett, 593 A.2d 382, 389 (N.J. Super.
1991) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled to attorneys' fees because he failed to meet
"his burden to prove that the fees were either reasonably necessary or caused by any
wrong doing" by the alleged tortfeasor).
C.

Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted Because Macris Failed to
Demand Payment of the Images Judgment Before February 2001,

On February 1, 2001, Macris's counsel wrote a letter to counsel for Images
demanding payment of the Images Judgment. (R. 889.) Just over two weeks later, on
February 16, 2001, the Images Judgment was paid in full, including interest (See
Statement of Facts, ^flj 16-17.) Because Macris never demanded that Images pay the
Images Judgment until February 2001, the parties cannot know whether the Images
Judgment would have been satisfied and whether this action truly was necessary.
Indeed, it appears that Macris's claim for attorneys' fees as consequential damages
was an after-thought that it raised only in response to Neways's motion for summary
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judgment, long after this case had been filed. This is best demonstrated in a statement
given by Macris's counsel at the hearing, held on January 26, 1996, on the parties' first
cross-motions for summary judgment. In that statement, counsel acknowledged that if
the judgment were paid, Macris would have no fraudulent transfer claim:

MR. KARRENBERG: ....

That's why I would do the same thing. I wouldn't add
the third corporation, your Honor, because one, the fraudulent
transfer action to the third corporation requires I first get a
judgment from this Court that can't be collected somewhere.
I mean, if I can collect this other judgment against Images,
the fraudulent transfer goes away by its [own] sake. I can
only collect my judgments [once], correct? You know what I
mean?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. KARRENBERG: If I go out and find Images has
some — if we come in here and by the time we go to trial I've
collected. I find Images had some assets, and I've collected
the full judgment for the first breach of Judge Burningham,
the fraudulent transfer is gone. By nature it doesn't
matter. I've collected my judgment. They can fraudulent
transfer all they want. I haven't been damaged by the
fraudulent transfer.
(R. 507 at 40-41; emphasis added.)11 Thus, early in this case, Macris acknowledged that
if it could collect the Images Judgment, it would have no damages. Despite that
knowledge, Macris waited until February 2001 to demand payment of the Images
The same logic applies to Macris's claims for successor liability and alter ego.
Once the Images Judgment was satisfied, those claims became moot.
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Judgment or otherwise attempt to discover what assets Images may have had to satisfy
the Images Judgment.
Macris cannot now, at this stage, reconstruct the past in a post-hoc attempt to
prove the necessity of the action. Macris had the burden to prove it was entitled to
attorneys' fees under the third-party litigation exception. Thus, it is Macris, not Neways
and the Mowers, that should bear the consequences of its own failure to demand payment
of the Images Judgment, or otherwise investigate Images's assets, before February 2001.
D.

The District Court Did Not Improperly Weigh Competing Inferences.

Finally, Macris argues that summary judgment was improper because the evidence
before the district court was "susceptible to two different inferences." (Applnt. Br. at 15.)
Although Macris relies on West v. Thomson Newspapers, 835 P.2d 179 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), to support its arguments, that opinion was expressly vacated by the Utah Supreme
Court in West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1020 (Utah 1994). Macris also
cites Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002UT 21, 44 P.3d 704, for the proposition that the district
court may not draw fact inferences on a motion for summary judgment. Only two
justices, however, joined in the portion of the opinion cited by Macris. Three justices
stated that they did not subscribe to the reasoning of Gray Tool Co. v. Humble Oil and
Ref. Co., 186 F.2d 365, 367 (5 th Cir. 1951), the case cited in the lead opinion. In his
opinion concurring in the result, in which Justices Russon and Durrant concurred, Justice
Wilkins stated that the rule under Gray Tool Co. "would be an unnecessarily limiting rule
of law in my opinion." 2002 UT 21, ^f 16.
i n - r\r\r*c
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In any event, Macris wholly failed to produce any admissible evidence in response
to the motion for summary judgment filed by Neways and the Mowers. Thus, there could
have been no "competing inferences," since there was no "competing evidence" offered
in response to the motion for summary judgment. Macris failed to satisfy its burden to
produce any evidence in support of its claim (on which it had the burden of proof) that
Images's alleged wrongful conduct made it necessary for this action to be filed. Thus,
the district court did not improperly weigh any competing inferences.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Neways and the Mowers respectfully request that
this Court affirm the district court's orders denying Macris's motion to compel and
granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Neways and the Mowers.
DATED this 24th day of May 2005.
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP

Marx R. Gay lord *
MarR
Craig H. Howe
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

UT DOCS A #1173440 v2

24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEES were served on the following this 24A day of May 2005, in the manner set
forth below:
[ ] Hand Delivery
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Certified Mail, Receipt No.

, return receipt requested

M. David Eckersley, Esq.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM

LAW OFFICES OF
D R 0 2 , REED & WANGSGARD, LC
77 West 200 South, Suite 401
Paul C Dm?

S a i l L a k e C l l y , U t a h 8 4 ] 01

ilnwlow(£)incmmrcx com

Telephone: (801) 578-3510
Facsimile: (801)578-3531
February 1,2001
VTA FACSIMILE AND CERTIFIED MAIL
(801)423-7210

Wade Winegar, Esq.
150 East 400 North
Salem. UT 84653
Re:

Macris & Associates. Inc., v. Images & Attitude, Inc., et al.

Dear Mr. Wincgar:
1 understand that you are counsel of record for Images & Attitude, Inc., in the above referenced
maner. Demand is hereby made upoc Images & Attitude, Inc., to satisfy the enclosed Judgment
entered in this case on September 14, 1995. Wc compute the amount presently due and owing at
$744,471.77 through today's date, with per diem interest accruing at 5125.68 per day from now
until paid in accordance with the stated 9.22% judgment interest rale. Our calculations
supponing the presently due amount of $744,471.77 are set forth on the attached schedule, for
your reference.
If we have not received poyment of the full amount due under this judgment by February
12, 2001, wc will have no choice but to pursue all available methods of collection. We would
appreciate bearing frpm you promptly.
Please govern yourselves accordingly.
Very truly yours,
DROZ, REED & WANGSGARD

Paul C. Droz
PCD:wh
Enclosures
Cc: Macris & Associates, Inc.

030889

RECEIVED
•HM 0 5 2003
M. David Eckersley (0956)
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.
;

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
TO DEFENDANTS* FIRST
SET OF REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

v.
NEWAYS, INC., THOMAS E. MOWER, i
and LESLIE D. MOWER,
Defendants.

Civil No. 950400093 CN
Judge: Gary D. Stott

j

Plaintiff Maoris & Associates, Inc., hereby submits the following responses to
Defendants' First Set of Requests for Production of Documents as follows:
REQUEST NO, 1 Produce all documents reflecting attorneys' fees and costs incurred by
Macris relating to work performed in the Maoris II Action up to and including the date the
judgment against Images and Attitude, Inc. ("Images") in the Macris I Action was satisfied.
RESPONSE: See copies provided herewith.
ftlNCE, YEATES
I GELOZAHLER
i Centre I, Suite 900
'5 East 400 South
^Satt Lake Crty
w
Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000

EXHIBIT

ni:18R9

PFniTFSTNO. 2 Produce all documents reflecting any demand(s) made upon Images, or
upon any other person or entity, to satisfy the judgment entered against Images in the
Macris I Action.
HF.SPONSE: See the letter dated February 1, 2001 from Paul Droz to Wade Winegar, a
copy of which is submitted herewith.
PFQ1JFSTNCL_3 Produce all documents that would be required to be produced if this
case were governed by Rule 26(a)(1) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, effective in
cases filed on or after November 1, 1999.
RFSPONSE: Plaintiff is in possession of approximately 15 bankers' boxes of documents
that were generated in connection with the Macris 1 and Macris II litigation. Defendants
are free to inspect and copy all such documents at a mutually convenient time between the
parties.
DATED this M, day of June, 2003.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By /h.A//*^/^
M. David Eckersley
Attorneys for Plaintiff

RINCE, YEATES
. GELDZAHLER
Centre I, Suite 900
East 400 South
ifeaH Lake City
Utah 84111
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